‘Why Eurasia Cannot Wait: A Charter for Our Time’

By Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Maxim Ryzhenkov

 

The Unfolding Crisis: Exter­nal Interference Confirmed

 

Last year, in an extensive piece on the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI Century, published by Russia in Global Affairs, I argued that external interference in the affairs of Eurasian countries has consistently prevented their suc­cessful and independent develop­ment. I traced this pattern from the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to the Organization for Securi­ty and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to the post-Cold War US strategies of “enlargement” and geostrategic domination ar­ticulated by former US National Security Advisers Anthony Lake and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

 

The current conflict in the Middle East has tragically and irrefutably confirmed this obser­vation. This conflict is not merely another regional tragedy. It is the latest violent proof that external actors cannot manage Eurasian security. Once again, we have witnessed the familiar pattern: unilateral intervention in viola­tion of international law, disre­gard for local realities, attempts to pit neighbours against each other, and the pursuit of strate­gic interests that have nothing to do with the well-being of the nations caught in the crossfire. The result, as always, is more death, more displacement, and a deeper erosion of any hope for regional stability.

 

Regrettably, the architects of these policies have not learned the lessons of the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Ukraine. They continue to believe that military force, unilateral sanctions, and political manipulation can re­shape Eurasia according to their own blueprints. And every time they fail, but only after causing immense suffering to the people on our continent.

 

For Eurasian countries, the message could not be clearer. We cannot rely on external guardi­ans to provide our security. We cannot wait for a “benign inter­national liberal order” to return, because such an order never truly existed in practice – it was never liberal, it was hegemonic. And we certainly cannot afford to remain passive while others attempt to determine the future of our continent. What we need – urgently – is our own solution, forged by us and for us. We need Eurasian solutions to Eurasian problems.

 

The Eurasian Charter: An In­digenous Solution Based on Indivisible Security

 

The core lesson of the cur­rent Middle East conflict, as well as of every other failed exter­nal intervention in Eurasia over the past three decades, is this: only an indigenous, inclusive, and consensus-based securi­ty architecture can work. The CSCE succeeded during the Cold War precisely because it was a genuine forum for dialogue be­tween the two camps that re­spected each other’s existence. The OSCE failed when it became an instrument for one group of participating states to impose its will on others. The so-called US-led “liberal order” failed be­cause it was never liberal – it was hegemonic.

 

What Eurasia needs instead is a new approach, grounded in the principle that has been in­voked since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act but never truly im­plemented: the indivisibility of security. No country in Eurasia should seek its own security at the expense of others. No exter­nal power should be allowed to play one Eurasian state against another. And no regional conflict should be treated as an opportu­nity for geopolitical gain.

 

This is precisely what the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI Cen­tury is supposed to offer.

 

As I argued in my piece from 2025, the Charter would not be directed against any country or groups of states. It is envisaged as a constructive, indigenous, collective, inclusive, and com­prehensive effort. It will seek to establish a pan-Eurasian security architecture based on the norms and principles of the United Nations Charter. It will cover not only security, but also economic cooperation, human­itarian exchanges, and civiliza­tional dialogue. It will welcome all Eurasian states, from Lisbon to Manila in principle.

 

At the heart of the Charter will lie the principle of indivisible security – present in the Hel­sinki preamble but never front and centre. This time, it must be. But we must go beyond in­vocation. The Charter should op­erationalize indivisible security through concrete, verifiable com­mitments, such as, for instance:

 

1. No state may join a mili­tary alliance whose membership criteria systematically exclude other Eurasian states without multilateral consultation.

 

2. No state may host perma­nent foreign military infrastruc­ture that materially threatens the core security interests of its neighbours without prior notifi­cation and verification under a multilateral framework.

 

3. All disputes between par­ticipating states should be sub­ject to mandatory consultation through the Charter’s institu­tions.

 

4. Participants should not apply unilateral coercive meas­ures against each other. These should be the points for negoti­ation. They should translate the principle of indivisible security from a noble slogan into an op­erational framework.

 

As a result, no Eurasian country should feel threatened by another’s legitimate securi­ty arrangements. No conflict in Eurasia should be resolved by force or by external diktat. And no country should be forced to choose between competing blocs.

 

The Charter will not be a vague declaration. It is intended to be a practical framework for action – a geostrategy for our su­percontinent, covering security, economics, technology, culture, and more. To that end, we en­vision the Charter establishing some specific institutions that do not overlap with numerous ex­isting Eurasian structures. Such new institutions may include, among others, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eur­asia, a small secretariat based in a neutral venue, a dispute reso­lution mechanism, and regular confidence-building exercises involving military-to-military dialogue. These ideas should be negotiated. The Charter should be a declaration with teeth.

 

From Discussion to Action

 

For nearly three years, the idea of the Eurasian Charter has been discussed in international forums, bilateral consultations and academic publications. The concept has attracted growing in­terest, and many Eurasian states have expressed support in prin­ciple. But discussion, however valuable, is not enough.

 

The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, as co-sponsors of the initiative, have prepared a concrete roadmap to move from discussion to formal negotiation. That roadmap is set out in a non-paper that has been shared with our Eurasian part­ners. Specifically, we propose to launch the negotiation process in September 2026, during the high-level week of the 81^st session of the United Nations General Assembly, with the assumption that it would lead to the adop­tion of the Charter’s final text at a Summit of Eurasian leaders, tentatively scheduled to be held before the end of 2027.

 

We understand that some may view the Charter with scep­ticism. Some may fear that it is directed against them. They may believe that their existing alliances and partnerships are sufficient. Others may simply be waiting to see how the process unfolds.

 

To these hesitations, I would like to offer three observations.

 

First, the Charter is not di­rected against anyone. It is open to all. Your participation is not a betrayal of any existing com­mitment – it is an investment in a more stable and predictable Eurasian order. The European Union, NATO members, and oth­er Western-aligned states are welcome to come to the table in good faith – as equal participants, not instructors.

 

Second, the external condi­tions that have supported Eu­ropean prosperity and security are rapidly changing. The United States is deprioritizing Europe, as is affirmed in its 2025 Nation­al Security Strategy. The era of unlimited free trade and cheap resources is over. Europe’s de­mographic, economic, and migra­tory challenges are mounting. No external power will save Europe from these trends. But coopera­tive action within Eurasia surely will.

 

Third, and most importantly, the cost of non-participation is growing by the day. Non-partic­ipation carries a different cost: the loss of a voice in shaping the rules that will govern this con­tinent for decades. Every state that sits at the table helps write the final text. Every state that stays away accepts rules written by others. We say this as a fact of diplomatic life. If you choose to stand outside the emerging Eurasian order, you will not be able to stop it. You will simply forfeit your seat at the table while others shape the future of the continent where you live.

 

We have seen what indige­nous cooperation can achieve. The Shanghai Cooperation Or­ganization’s quiet containment of border tensions in Central Asia, ASEAN’s resilience de­spite great power competition, the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s rapid consulta­tions during the 2022 crisis in Kazakhstan – these are not per­fect models. But they are ours. The Charter seeks to scale these lessons continent-wide, learning from both the successes and the failures of every Eurasian secu­rity experiment.

 

The time for discussion has passed. The time for hesitation has passed. The events of 2026 have sounded an alarm that no responsible country can ignore.

 

Eurasia needs a new secu­rity architecture – one based on indivisible security, mutual respect, and genuine partner­ship. The Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI Century is the means to build that architecture. And September 2026 in New York is the moment to begin.

 

I call upon all Eurasian states to join us in launching this historic process. Let us prove that we can shape our own des­tiny.

 

(Views and opinions in this arti­cle solely belong to the author).