A brief juxtaposition of Spinoza’s and Stephen Hawking’s philosophical determinism
By
Dr Myint Zan
WORLD
Philosophy
Day for 2025 is on 20 November. By chance or perhaps by (un?) intended(?)
design, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), in 2002, declared the third Thursday in each year to be ‘World
Philosophy Day’. That day is close to the birthday of the Dutch philosopher
Baruch (‘Benedictus’) Spinoza (24 November 1632-21 February 1677).
Brief
juxtaposition of Marcus Aurelius ‘non-wish’ and Spinoza’s wish for their philosophical
legacies
Spinoza, who thrived’ over 350 years
ago, had apparently copied his letters with his correspondents (at least those
where he discussed philosophical issues) before he mailed them.
Retrospectively, one can surmise that Spinoza wished that many aspects of his
philosophical thought, including those stated in his letters to be recorded
for posterity. Spinoza had his wish (so to speak) fulfilled in the very year of
his death in 1677. Spinoza’s friends were kind enough to arrange to publish all
of his philosophical writings in the Latin language, including his letters, in
a book titled Opera Posthuma in late 1677.
Contrast this with the Roman Emperor
Marcus Aurelius (26 April 121-17 March 180), who apparently asked his
underlings (so to speak) to destroy his ‘diary’ (‘notes to himself’) after his
death, which they did not ‘follow’. Now, more than 1900 years after Marcus’
birth, there are at least three or four versions of English translations alone.
The title of the English translations is Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. One
has read that at the time of Spinoza’s death, there were about 160 books in
his ‘library’. One wonders whether Latin, Dutch or Portuguese translations of
Meditations in Spinoza’s library. (Spinoza can read and write in those
languages, perhaps) Apparently, unlike Marcus, there was no standing
instruction from Spinoza to destroy his manuscripts and his correspondence. The
fact that he even kept a copy of his own correspondence and those who wrote to
him indicates that, as far as (not) preserving his philosophical legacy is
concerned, Baruch Spinoza was ‘no Marcus Aurelius’.
Spinoza’s
stone analogy
This article will address the issue of
philosophical determinism that can be discerned in the following paragraph (in
English translation) in one of Spinoza’s letters:
Further conceive, I beg, that a stone
while continuing in motion should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it
is endeavouring, as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being
conscious merely of its own endeavour and not at all indifferent, would
believe itself to be completely free, and it would think that it continued in
motion solely because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all
boast that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact that men are
conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that
desire has been determined. (Letter to GH Schaller, October 1674)
Among others, the three sentences in
English translation above ‘determine’ (pun intended) that Spinoza was a
philosophical determinist. Without distorting Spinoza’s message, it can perhaps
be deemed that if a stone were to have human consciousness or simply can think
like a human, that stone, like humans, including some philosophers, would have
thought that it is moving on its own out of its own free will. Spinoza
apparently rejected that humans have free will. Though not manifestly stated in
the above excerpt, Spinoza apparently was of the view that human lives and
their ‘trajectories’ have already been determined.
Stephen
Hawking’s rejection or scepticism of the criminal law doctrine of ‘diminished
responsibility’
If one fast forward from the late 17th
century to the late 20th century astrophysicist Stephen Hawking (8 January
1942- 18 March 2018) in a lecture given in March 1990 also expressed his
opinion (or is it non-belief) in human free will (as reproduced in the essay
‘Is Everything determined?’ in the book Black Holes and Baby Universes, first
published 1993).
Under the concept of diminished
responsibility in British criminal law, a few criminal defendants’ culpability
can, in exceptional circumstances, be reduced or even more rarely, they can
be acquitted of their crimes on grounds of ‘diminished responsibility’. The
thrust of the idea behind Hawking’s radical and novel proposal is that, since
all human beings’ actions are determined, why give special preference to those
criminal defendants from the rare defence of ‘diminished responsibility’ (say
on grounds of insanity)?
Hawking seems to be saying: do not
accept (a few) criminal defendants’ claims of diminished responsibility and
their claims that ‘I could not help myself’ since other criminals, indeed all
human beings in their actions, cannot but help themselves also.
In the ‘mother country’ of Great
Britain, as well as its former colonies from Australia through India and
Malaysia to Zimbabwe, as far as this writer is aware, the criminal law doctrine
of ‘diminished responsibility’ has not been abolished.
A
Spinozist ‘take’ on Stephen Hawking’s philosophical determinism?
Curiosity: If Spinoza were to come back,
would he have agreed with Hawking’s version of philosophical determinism?
Would Spinoza, after studying a bit of modern criminal law and criminology,
agree with Hawking’s suggestion that the legal doctrine of diminished
responsibility be altogether abolished?
Dr Myint Zan, a retired Professor
of Law, taught Jurisprudence (Legal Philosophy) at Multimedia University in
Malacca, Malaysia, from 2006 to 2016. Between the years 2016 to 2022, five
post-doctoral scholars have visited the Philosophy Department of the
Australian National University, which is one of their alma maters, on a Myint
Zan Philosophy Fellowship
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